In the latest installment of our Human Domain series, Louis L. Cook examines Information Operations effectiveness in multi-domain operations through a focused look at the offensive and defensive uses of Operations Security (OPSEC).
Seventy years of American invulnerability to existential threats is coming to an end and Civilian and Military leaders will have to adapt.
Peter Layton explores how future warfighting concepts and network/combat cloud design are now interdependent – with the actual platform design of more secondary importance. He notes how, in moving to a fifth-generation force, networks and combat clouds are the fundamental building blocks and we need to get them right.
Much of the debate over future force structure, command and control, and strategy writ large is littered with unexplored assumptions and muddled thinking. This article explores some of the most recent examples of imprecise language, unqualified assumptions, and outright myths one frequently sees as the US Department of Defense attempts to build a ready force that can match lethality and military effectiveness with purpose in the emerging operational environment.
Part 2 of the conclusion to a series on training and developing autonomous wingmen for future aerial combat.
In part 1 of a 2-part series conclusion, Nick Helms discusses foundations and processes for testing and training autonomous air vehicles.
Theater-level ISR C2 must be modernized to ensure the Joint Force is prepared for a complex future and can achieve multi-domain success.
Authors Jefferson, Hans, and Wehrle use historical examples and national security to discuss the importance of deep space exploration and the requirement for advanced propulsion systems.
Brandon Losacker examines how the US Air Force can achieve a more capable CSAR aircraft to ensure its promise to American and allied warriors on future battlefields.
This article on Mission Command looks at how contested domains will force subordinate leaders to make timely decisions that either seize or forfeit the initiative.
The AF concept of UAVs has centered on combat missions, leaving airlift as largely unexplored potential.
This is the first installment of our new Human Domain series. In it, Robert M. Schoenhaus discusses the importance of considering human influence when taking an indirect approach to operational planning and introduces the term “social intelligence.”
In this article, we are delving into the concept of trust as it applies to training autonomous air vehicles like human wingmen or co-pilots.
Russia is using nationalism to regain control over former Soviet Union States, a phenomenon predicted by Halford Mackinder in 1904.
Further advancing our conversation on approaching risk in a future characterized by complexity and uncertainty, David Pappalardo presents Risk and Courage.
Through historic analysis, Losacker discusses the requirement for organic firepower as a part of future survivable rescue helicopters.
Through historic analysis, Losacker discusses how current and future conflicts require a large dispersed fleet of vertical rescue assets.
Through a historic analysis, Brandon Losacker discusses how speed, inventory, and armament affect the survival of a rescue vehicle.
An Armenian perspective on the dynamics of US–Russia relations and their implications for the South Caucasus.
This is the first article in a multi-part series focused on modernizing Command and Control (C2) of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
This is the second installation in a series addressing the future of autonomous aerial systems training and acquisition.
Autonomous air vehicles in a combat environment will be more useful if they are capable of adapting effectively to changing human demands.
To comprehend how a single generation can affect the nuclear enterprise, we should examine what is missing from the current organizational culture models.
This article visits traceable history of Air Force mismanagement of the combat rescue helicopter forces that are the backbone of the larger joint and coalition personnel recovery enterprise.
Joint Doctrine does not sufficiently and separately address risk as both a necessary part of military operations and as a series of hazards to the force. Risk is not just a list of “things to avoid and mitigate,” but instead must be identified and categorized into two separate classes: accidental and operational. A conflation of these two types of risk directly contributes to the perception that the US military is a “risk averse” organization that refuses to allow for and appropriately reward prudent risk-taking. Thusly, Joint Doctrine must specify the differences between accidental and operational risk in a more deliberate way than it currently does in order to provide clarity to commanders and staffs.
To achieve dominance in the networked age, the U.S. Air Force must build organizational expertise that can foster a culture that lives and breathes multi-domain integration.
The military is at a crossroads. Overmatch in firepower and maneuver led to its past successes, but they alone cannot win tomorrow’s wars. The concept of MDB is a method for today’s tactical leaders to change the playing field of tomorrow’s wars.
Unlike most industrial-era schools of thought, human beings are not interchangeable cogs in a machine, and this is the basis for modern talent management. Ultimately, readiness is ensuring that Service members are placed in jobs with the right training, equipment, experience, and background to allow for successful mission accomplishment.
The calculus for US basing options has changed. The dispersed basing concept, combined with hardening and other solutions, offers the US the ability to survive and project power towards peacetime credibility and commitment, while also providing capacity to execute effective multi-domain operations in conflict. The United States must implement access-enhancing measures now to optimize—and maintain—its power-projection capability in the not-so-distant future.
By Aaron Sick
The Combat Cloud and associated network must exhibit critical attributes such as the ability to be self-forming, self-healing, gracefully degradable, and redundant. Under this construct, the ability to collect data and integrate it in an open, adaptive information system will significantly enhance C2 and operational agility for the US military and other US governmental agencies across the range of military operations.
By Shaun Williams and Jacob Hess
Time and again, in war or natural calamity, USAF rescue crews charge unhesitatingly into the midst of death’s rage to save the desperate few. It is this quiet devotion that underwrites the Air Force’s promise to the combat aircrew it sends into harm’s way: We won’t leave you. There is great power in this promise.
By Brandon Losacker
Commanders must be willing to allow risk to be assumed at every echelon and to encourage prudent risk taking throughout his/her command. On an increasingly unpredictable battlefield, commanders must seek every opportunity to rapidly and effectively seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. An understanding of the risks associated with any and all actions must be thoroughly understood in order to most effectively seize on overlaid risk opportunities while avoiding underlaid ones.
By Tom Flounders
The fifth generation warfare notion wraps up network-centric warfare, combat cloud, multi-domain battle, and fusion warfare concepts. These are all important ideas that do not exist individually but rather function together as an integrated interdependent system of systems where the whole is greater than the parts.
By Peter Layton
There are compelling reasons for implementing dispersed basing, including survivability and the capacity to execute multi-domain operations. There are also significant challenges to overcome, including building partnerships; sustainment; restructuring personnel and training requirements; ensuring command, control, communications, and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) connectivity; and base defense.
By Aaron Sick
Today’s increasingly dynamic operational environment requires a full spectrum of multinational capabilities that span across the domains, especially those that are typically very coalition heavy, such as peacekeeping missions and humanitarian assistance. This diversity requires coalition members to become part of a dynamic information-sharing system and a specific C2 network.
By El Mostafa Bouhafa and Jacob Hess
The United States Air Force must be far more clever with the use of the assets at its disposal.
By Peter Garretson
Proper balance between contract support and organic logistics forces is imperative to ensure the US Army’s ability to meet the future demands of a multi-domain battlespace.
By Jessica McCarthy
The military does not create cyber culture, because it is not solely a military occupation.
By John Myers
The success of our past and future battles depends on a lot more than what we do with our platforms — it depends on what platforms we have developed, where we have based them, and our partner building capacity.
By Peter Garretson
This initial cyber cadre will eventually recruit, train, and grow more junior personnel as the program expands.
By John Myers
Multi-Domain thinking requires an understanding of the nature of domains and how they interact with each other, while ultimately focusing on affecting participants in order to achieve a lasting outcome understood in the human domain.
By Tom Flounders
Multi-domain theory contains the potential for problem-based—rather than Service-based—solutions, leading to increased options for warfighters and decision-makers while presenting adversaries with increasing dilemmas.
By Jon Bott
Sustaining operations in the hypothesised dispersed and deadly conflict zones of the present and future creates especially acute problems for land forces in multi-domain battle.
By David Beaumont
It is important to recognize multi-domain operations as an important new operational concept that is more mindset than prescribed method, one that evolves previous thought, and one that itself deserves continued development.
By Jonathan Bott
Everything ran in its own compartment. I think that far more than people realize, it was a tragedy of bureaucratic inability to adapt to unconventional
Innovation is not an end in and of itself, but rather a tool that can be used to achieve a desired end.
By Jon Farley
Welcome to OTH’s first podcast! For this debut episode we discuss the evolution of military design and how we might bridge theory to practice.
By Jonathan Bott Hew Strachan wrote that “getting the questions right is the first step to finding the correct answers.” In considering the challenges of
Utilizing cyberspace as a warfighting domain is still, however, in its infancy. It must evolve similar to how the utilization of the air domain evolved during the 20th century
By Joed Carbonell
AMC C4ISR capability is dependent on deployment and sustainment capabilities provided by multiple organizations using a mixture of classified and unclassified systems. These systems have significant vulnerabilities in regards to operational security and potential cyber attacks.
By Isaiah Oppelaar